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American Trade Politics, by I. M. Destler, is an outstanding chronicle
of domestic politics concerning the formulation of American trade policy
from the 1930s to the present. At best, the book details the changes in
congressional-executive relations governing trade agreements and devel-
opments in statutory trade rules. While the proposals for future action
are less innovative, what it tells the lawyer, lobbyist, scholar, and policy
formulator about the current issues and institutions is indispensable. What
the reader learns about Congress's abdication of constitutional respon-
sibility in trade is shocking.
The author's theme is the need to correct an erosion in our trade policy-
making institutions. At the crux, Destler asserts that a 1935 doctoral
dissertation claiming special interests in Congress caused the adoption of
the disastrous Smoot-Hawley tariff bill. The author claims that the trend
since then has been towards the development of antiprotectionist coun-
terweights for diverting trade-restrictive pressures. In light of global
changes, however, the system has undergone substantial challenge, and
much needs to be done to further ensure congressional protection from
special interests.
One of the means developed in the post-war era to divert pressure from
the Congress and the President was the expansion of quasi-judicial reg-
ulatory procedures centered around the International Trade Commission
and the International Trade Administration (of the Department of Com-
merce). This system, in combination with "special deals," free-trade Pres-
idents, and strong congressional committees (Senate Finance and House
Ways and Means) made the trade system work. The President would tend
to his trade-expanding work while special interests pursued their trade
remedies.
As part of the system, Congress delegated authority to the President
to negotiate trade agreements (executive agreements). When tariffs be-
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came less important and nontariff barriers (NTBs) became more impor-
tant, the Congress needed to pass legislation at both ends of the process
to authorize the negotiations and to implement them. Congress did this
through innovative "fast-track" procedures in the 1970s concerning the
Tokyo Round and the 1979 Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) Codes
and recently concerning the United States-Canadian Free Trade Agree-
ment. Vvith the rise in importance of NTBs, other congressional com-
mittees become players in the field. This tended to make congressional
policy-making even less predictable. The Reagan Administration just barely
contained protectionist pressures in the 1984 Trade and Tariff Act and
faces an uphill battle in the 100th Congress.
Trade rules, such as section 201 ("escape clause relief"), section 301
("retaliation") of the Trade Act of 1974, and antidumping/countervailing
duties have consistently been strengthened by Congress in the 1960s and
1970s. Conceptually, this strengthening allows both the President and
Congress to deflect special interest demands for product-specific legis-
lation and protection and to use such procedures as an escape valve.
Actually, the procedures have been used as a means to increase pressure
on foreign governments, rather than merely to divert pressure. Destler
believes the rules play "a significant role in concept, and a modest role
in practice" (p. I 11).
The unique part of this book is the author's compilation and analysis
of administrative case data from administration summaries to substantiate
his arguments. The author argues that the illfated 1986 Omnibus Trade
bill contained so many changes to administrative actions that a form of
"process protectionism" could emerge and has to be guarded against in
the 100th Congress. The author suggests giving more discretion to the
President in applying all trade remedies.
What has happened in the 1970s and 1980s? According to the author,
trade politics have become more partisan. Destler argues that an historical
reversal of roles has taken place. The Democrats are now protectionist,
and the Republicans free traders. Intellectual challenges to open-market
policies have grown. (Witness the debate over industrial policy, compet-
itiveness and the need for "fair trade.") In addition to the trends noted
by Destler, newer and more vocal industry and business coalitions have
developed. These coalitions are lining up both for and against trade
proposals.
Most of all, Destler argues, the old system of diverting and managing
trade pressures has been seriously injured by massive macroeconomic
developments. The author asserts fleetingly and only paradoxically so,
unfortunately, that Congress has not yet reclaimed its constitutional pri-
macy over foreign trade. Destler views the actions of the 1980s (such as
voluntary export restraints on Japanese automobiles and steel restraints
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with the European Communities) as amounting to an unwarranted exten-
sion of "managed trade."
The author believes that the United States may be on the verge of new
special deals for special cases, "process protectionism," and a new ideo-
logical debate on trade. He proposes several remedies based on an as-
sumption of "free trade."
Destler next asserts that trade measures are generally ineffective
in addressing trade problems. He identifies major macroeconomic
problems as the culprits, the most important being the high value of
the dollar attributed to international capital flows caused by high U.S.
interest rates stemming from the large federal budget deficit. The
author states that by "[u]sing corrective macroeconomic policy mea-
sures, as well as reforms in structure and process ... government
can attack those large imbalances that so burden trade policymakers.
For these economy wide 'trade' problems have, by their nature, no
trade policy solutions." (p. 191)
Destler supports greater productivity as a means of alleviating the trade
problem. He then suggests changes in "structure and process." He would
convert the Office of the United States Trade Representative into a smaller,
elite unit in the Executive Office of the White House, create a new United
States Trade Administration, abolish the Department of Commerce, and
give greater discretion to the President in imposing statutory trade remedies.
Destler also suggests changes in congressional committee organization
such as strengthening the House Ways and Means Committee by desig-
nating its chairman as head of a House Trade Steering Committee, which
would act as the floor leader on general trade legislation. As the author
points out, these proposals draw on ideas that arose during the Carter
administration's trade reorganization deliberations.
To me, these suggestions seem old hat. Proposals to do away with the
Commerce Department and fiddle around with executive and congres-
sional organization are only minor contributions at best. Some I do not
agree with. Changes in trade laws are necessary and more judicial review
can only further depoliticize trade problems. These proposals are similar
to the developments that led to the congressional ordering of judicial
determination of sovereign immunity in the mid-1970s and the removal
of the Department of State from the process even though the Department
of State was the prime mover of the 1976 legislation.
While giving the President greater latitude in imposing statutory trade
remedies would recognize the merger of trade policy with larger issues
of foreign policy, it would have a lightning rod effect for both domestic
and international pressures. If a grant of such authority is matched by a
greater degree of judicial review, however, it ought to be acceptable.
Presidents are elected to decide tough national interests.
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The strength of this book is the author's detailing of the parameters of
trade developments over the last fifty years and more particularly over
the last decade. Especially interesting is Destler's thoughtful description
of the development and transformation of the nature of congressional
delegation of authority concerning executive trade agreements and de-
velopment of particular statutory trade remedies and their impact. Whether
or not it is bad that procedures have been "distorted" away from avoid-
ance of pressure to asserting pressure, I am not yet convinced. I believe
regularizing demands for change in a judicial or quasi-judicial process is
preferable to back-slapping and back room deal-making on either the
domestic or international levels.
The author's decision to limit his review to imports only, excluding
exports in international trade, while somewhat understandable, leaves out
the very significant and main area of contention and action of the last few
years. Export controls and the new 1985 export legislation are of crucial
importance. Export promotion and export controls of commodities and
high technology are at the very center of the American problem. There
is a need to strike a balance between regulating imports into the United
States and fostering viable policies concerning the competitive role of
U.S. firms in the world market place and the U.S. export environment
generally. The problem may be as much with U.S. firms as with foreign
practices.
Some discussion of the trade implication of the recent farreaching tax
reform would have been helpful. Needless to say, any discussion of that
issue may just be too speculative at this point. In addition, a discussion
of national security issues and trade sanctions should have emerged from
anydiscussion of export controls, although such issues are also involved
and should have been raised with any discussion of imports (such as
restricting imports from South Africa, Iran, and Nicaragua). A discussion
of intra-multinational corporate transactions and trade by American sub-
sidiaries abroad would have given a greater perspective on the very real
strengths of American management.
What is more disturbing about this book is that the author contends
that the system that developed during the 1930s was beneficial. That
system depended on the abdication of Congress in exercising its plenary
authority under the Constitution in regulating international trade. This
refusal to act was clearly contrary to the intent of the drafters of the
Constitution where plenary authority for such regulation was placed with
Congress.
Now, congressional abdication is no longer feasible. Congress must own
up to its constitutional responsibility to control the budget and to regulate
international trade. Hiding behind a false facade of legal-administrative
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protectionism created by Congress itself, it has escaped its plenary re-
sponsibility out of self-interest. Congress did not really want to get in-
volved in a meaningful way in tough issues. To a great extent, neither did
the President.
Congress simply did not act in the post-war era. The failure of American
trade policy has been principally the failure of the Congress to formulate
pro-competitive policies and to curb dysfunctional legislative and regu-
latory actions both in trade issues and macroeconomic matters. The Con-
stitution gave the plenary authority to Congress to regulate international
trade. It cannot blame the President or administrative agencies. The time
has arrived for the Congress to do what is required.
International regulation may or may not require government action. But
those are decisions of the Congress. The less government intervention,
the better. Unlike the domestic economy, however, the international econ-
omy is populated by foreign government actors. Some government action
appears necessary on the fluctuation of currency rates. The author's con-
tention concerning the need for trade action seems minimal. Surely, greater
legal and administrative relief, if properly fashioned, is itself a minimal
response.
We are plying unknown international political and economic waters.
We need less doctrinaire and partisan responses and more thoughtful
analysis and empirical observation. The author's diagnosis, if not his
prognosis, seems to have added greatly to such an undertaking.
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